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In Bank. .Jan . .11, 1949.]

of LEWIS WARREN SMITH, Deceased. BRANFORD BAPTIST CHURCH, Apptllant, •. A].IY
,EDITH NICHOLS, Respondent; WELLS FARGO
.BANK'" UNION TRUST CO., as Executor, etc.
Marriage-PresumptioDS and Burden of Proof.-When a peraon has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption
arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and
. the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
'marriage to prove that the first mnrri:lge had not been dis• 'Solved by the death of a spouse or by divorce or had not been
auulled at the time of the second marriage,
an estate proceeding, the evidence supa finding that a ClllimllDt wns the 'trife of th" tcstntor
time of his death, where she tcstified thllt she cntrrccl
• a marriage ceremony with another m::m in rdiancl\ on a
by the testator that he hnd obtained a divorce,
the testator's denth she was unable to find nny
of a divorce, and that she did not receive any divorce
papers or notice of a divorce action from the testator; where
there was other evidence that her marriage to the testator
. Jaad not been dissolved by divorce; and where the testator,
who was not shown to have married again, bequeathed a sum
.,tmoney to his "wife."
BrldeD.C4""':Heaniay·-]~cept;iol18 to Rulc-Pedigree.-Decl:ll'aa deceased person that he was dh'orced from his
widow and that she was ht'! "cx-wife," nre admissible
exception to the 'hearsay rule. (Code Ch'. Prue.,

16 Cal.Jur. 928,934; 35 Am.Jur. 306,315.
.. 10 CaLJur.ll06j 20 Am.Jur. 412.
. Dig. References: [1] l\'[arringe, §§ 27, 28; [2J M:ming-e,
E"'idence, 5257; [4] Appeal and Error, §1613; [G]llar27(7).
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to rebut the presumption of the v:llidity ot n ~uh!lI'(IUrnt,
marri:lge, it is not neClt'Sllnry to provt', fhnt lin "xIIDlin'ltion
was made of the public rerot'ds of juriRdirtion!l other thlln

BO :IS

those in which the pnrtic8 to the first marrisge were domiciled.

APPEAL from a judgment of t.he Superior Court of the
City and County of Snn Francisco decret'inl(' dwtribution 9£
an estate. T. I. Fitzpatrick, Judge. Affirmed.
Jay A. Darwin and Clifton E. Brooks for Appellant.
Weinmann, Moffitt & Quayle and Cyril Viadro for
Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Lewis Warren Smith died on May 28,
1945, leaving a holographic will dated April 7, 1942. By his
will he bequeathed "to my wife the sum of Five Dollars"
and $500 to the widows' and orphans' fund of a lodge of
Masons, and left the residue of his estate to the Branford
Baptist Church of Connecticut.
Amy Edith Smith, respondent, filed a claim against the
estate alleging that she is the wido\v of the testator. She
claims that she is entitled to two-thirds of the estate on the
ground that charitable bequests under section 41 of the Probate Code may not collectively exceed· one-third of the estate
as against the spouse of the decedent.
It is undisputed that respondent married the testator in
January, 1926, and that they lived together until 1932 or
1933. It is also undisputed that in November, 1938, respondent entered into a marriage ceremony with Ralph N. Nichols,
with whom she lived until May 13, 1945. After evidence was
introduced relating to the marital status of respondent, the
probate court found that respondent was the widow of the
testator, and entered a decree of distribution, ordering that
two-thirds of the residue of the estate be distributed to her.
After completion of the hearing in the probate proceedinltS
but before the entry of the decree, Ralph N. Nichols, who had
previously commenced a divorce action against respondent,
filed an amended complaint, in which he requested an annulment on the ground that at the time of respondent's marriage
to him she was married to the testator. Neither Nichols nor
respondent testified in the annulment proceeding, which was
held five days after the entry of the decree of distribution in
the probate proceeding. Counsel for Nichols introduced the
record of the decree, whereupon the annulment was granted.
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Baptist Church appeals from the decree of
,[1] It is \VeIl established that when a person has entered
two succ~ssive marriages, a presumption arises in favor
'; the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is
.;iilntl'll the party attacking the validity of the second marriage
that the first marriage had not been dissolved by the
.C;JA&lW of a spouse or by divorce or had not been annulled at
time of the second marriage. (Hunter v. Hunter, 111
.261 [43 P. 756, 52 Am.St.Rep. 180, 31 L.R.A. 411];
v. Wilcox, 171 Cal. 770, 774 [155 P. 95]; Estate of
_ ......,..."'. 173 Cal. 141, 143 [159 P. 433] ; Estat. 01 Hugkso"-,,
448, 452 [160 P. 548]; Hamburg" v. Hys, 22 Cal.
r.;-..PJ".QU 508, 509 [71 P.2d 301] ; Immel v. DO'Wd, 6 Cal.App.2d
147 [44 P.2d 373].) That burden is sustained if the
R'lm.:ieIlLce, in the light of all re:lsonable inferences therefrom,
IP.t.iIlOln1, that the first marriage was not so dissolved or annulled.
v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 66 [23 N.W. 110, 53 Am.
1I.i"I:~....~,..,I" 253]; Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 505 [89
~4~.;.;Il(.;.110, 24 L.R.A. N.S. 1199]; 8ckmisse1tr v. Beat"e, 147
210, 217 [35 N.E. 525]; Oole v. OoZe, 153 Ill. 585, 587
N.E. 703] ; Barnes v. Barnes, 90 Iowa 282, 285 [57 N.W.
; Oolored Knights 0/ Pytkias v. Tucker, 92. Miss. 501,
',[46 So. 51]; Brokeskoulder v. Brokeskoulder, 84 Okla .
.[204 P. 284, 288, 34 A.L.R. 441].) "There can be no
.\sol:a:te presumption against the continuance of the life of
to a marriage, in order to establish the innocence
other party to a subsequent marriage; much less can
,a rigid presumption of a dissolution of the first
U'l'lU'e·· by divorce, in order to make out such innocence. . . .
particular case, -the -question-must be determined, like
question of Ifact, upon a consideration of the attend.
and circumstances, and such inferences as fairly and
[qiII"'I!,aUJLY fiow therefrom." (1 Jones, Commentaries On Evi·
1I~~i,;J.U'O.UI'J:.)

_':-,,"__...,"'" The question, therefore, is whether there was sub.
Ml~1tUU· evidence to support the finding of the probate court
~llati'resP<l,ndent was the wife of the testator at the time of his
, Respondent testified that before her marriage to Nichols
she and Nichols visited the testator in a town near
[t;';Ca:l,ifc~rn:ia; that the testator informed her that he had
. a divorce and that the divorce papers were in his
ae]iK>S_lt, box. Respondent entered into a marriage cere.

-)
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mont'Y with Nichols in reliance upon this information. Re.
spondent further testified that after the death of the testator
she made investigations in San Francisco, where she supposed
that he had resided, and in Los Angeles, where she and the
testator were married, but was unable to find any record of
a divorce dissolviJlg their marriage; she made similar investi~ations in Lake County, where the testator maintained a place
for camping, and~n Reno, Nevada, but no record of a divorce
was discovered. Counsel for the executor stated that he had
"examined the divorce records of a number of counties," but
was unable to find any record of divorce in an action involving
respondent and the testator. After the probate court had
granted a continuance for the purpose of permitting further
search, counsel for appellant made an investigation of divorce
records in California. He stated that he had received reports
from 56 of the 58 counties of the state, showing uo record of
a divorce between respondent and the testator. Respondent
testified that she did not receive any divorce papers or any
notice of a divorce action from the testator. Although this
testimony may not in itself be sufficient, it is persuasive when
considered with other evidence that respondent's marriage
to the testator had not been dissolved by divorce.
The trial court could reasonably infer that had an annulment been secured the existence of such a decree would have
been discovered in the search of records of the various counties
of the state. Moreover, the provision in the will by which
the testator bequeathed $5.00 "to my wife" precludes the
conclusion that he had secured either a divorce or an annulment from rE'spondent. Since there is no evidence that the
tegtator had married again, the probate court could rCilson~
ubly infer that he was referring to respondent by that
provision.
[3] Appell811t contends that it was error for the probate
('(lurt to exclude certain oral declarations of the testator.
/\. ppellant made an offer of proof to show by the testimony of
three disinterested witnesses, who were close frit'nds of -the
.. 'stator living in San Francisco, that the testator had mnde
f?peated statements· that he was divorced from respondent
:lnd that she was his "ex-wife." Declarations of a deceased
pt'rson in respect to his relationship to any person are admissi.
ble as an except.ion to the hearsay rule. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1890(4) : Estate of Friedman, 178 Cal. 27. 35 [172 P. 140];
Estate (J/ldor{lan, 208 Cal. 569, 576 [265 P. 241] ; Est-ft·te of
Strong, 54 Cal.App.2d 604, 608-609 [129 P.2d 493].) Declara-
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tions of the testcltor rl·garding his relatiullship t(. rt'sponut>nt
were, therefore, ndmil'lsibJe. [4] The refusal to admit them,
!towever, was not prcjuclicial, for rCl:ipondcnt had previously
'testified to a similar declaration made to her by the testator.
: ,The probate court in deciding that the marriage was not
'.' dissolved may bav.e concluded, in view of the other evidence,
that the testator made', such statements under a mistaken
.. belief that he had taken' all the necessary steps in obtaining
divorce.
. . [IS] In order to show that no divorce or annulment bad
_;:~JU obtained it is not necessary to prove that an examination
made of the public records of jurisdictions other than
which the parties to the marriage were domiciled .
• 'IW~maen1l~tna v. Parker, 69 Ca1.App. 685, 686 [231 P. 765] ;
v. Beatrie, BtI,pm, 147 m. 210, 217; Barne, v.
B(Jr,~", supra, 90 Iowa 282, 285; see Im.mel v. Dowd, S1tpra,
Cal.App.2d 145, 147.) It appears from the evidence that
-',,"',,-_.' his marriage with respondent, the testator entered the
....'. _ .."..... business in Los Angeles and that in 1938 he was living
Taft, California. He maintained a camping place in
County and died in San Francisco in 1945. Although
evidence does not account for evcry place where the
re~ded during the years following his separation
Ei;~lm rt!Spondent, it is sUfficient to support a reasonable infer.,:ISQ''''' that he was domiciled in California from the time of his
EJItUP>arfLtioln from respondent until the time of bis,death. Appelconcedes that the testator was domiciled in San Francisco
K:jll:nring this period. The o:IIer of proof made by appellant for
nllrnj[)Se of admitting certain declarations of the testator
•.'jltlllll\ved that tbe testator had maintained his headquarters
1I';~"IU1Ci8' 1930 at the Class A Garage in San Francisco, where
,'1unJally returned at the end of each fishing season; and
,he lived at a near by hotel, where he had always received

C. J., Shenk,
., concurred.

.J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and

C"U,,JLL.,,,,,,UEB, J.-I dissent. It is my view that respondent
to meet the burden of proving the illegality of her
'In< to Nichols, that the finding of the probate court that
aJJ(JlnQ~ent is the widow of the testator is without substantial

_~,uwe:a
......T ...
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Impport in thf' evidence, and that the portion of the judg.
ment appealed from should be reversed.
For what appears to Die to be a logical and convincing
refutation of the views taken by the majority of this court,
reference is made tQ;the opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding
Justice Peters for tne District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, reported at (Cal.App.) 193
P.2d 90.
In further support of appellant's position herein, and of
the conclusion reached by the District Court of Appeal, it
may be pointed out that for aught that is shown in the record
the testator, a sea captain, may and mud be presumed to have
secured a decree of divorce in some domestic or foreign jurisdiction, the validity of which decree respondent, by virtue
of her subsequent marriage to Nichols,is now estopped to
deny. (See Kelley Y. MiUer (1928), 203 Cal. 61, 86·87 [263
P. 2oo); In re Kyle (1947), 77 CaLApp.2d 634, 639·640
[176 P.2d 96}.} The domicile of the parti61 and the place of
diflorce become entirely immaterial where the party seeking
10 attack the diflorce has remarried. When that circumstance
is shown, as it is here, if there has been a divorce in any jurisdiction its effect cannot be challenged by a former .spouse
who has accepted its benefits and remarried.
The presumption of innocence of crime is one of the strongest disputable presumptions known to the law. (See discussion
and authorities cited, infra.) As stated by Justice Peters
(p. 94 of 193 P.2d), "even if there is 'some' evidence that
might be interpreted to be contrary to the presumption, it
must be conceded that such evidence is very weak indeed.
This being . , anyl~rror in excluding evidence that might
support the presumption takes on added significance. There
ean he no doubt that the trial court committed error in excluding the declarations of decedent made to intimate acquaintances on numerous occasions that he was divorced from
respondent, and that she was his 'ex-wife' .•. Respondent
concedes, as she must, that it was error to have excluded these
declarations of relationship [see Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(4) ;
Estate of Morgan- (1928), 203 Cal. 569 [265 P. 241} ; Estate
of Friedman (1918), 178 CnI. 27 [172 P. 140J; Estate of
Strong (1942), 54 Cal.App.2d 604 [129 P.2d 493)], but contends that such error was not prejudicial because respondent
had admitted that decc.>dent had declared to her that he had
secured a divorce and 'no amonnt of additional evidence to
the same effect could do her so much daml\ie as her own testi-
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"monyon that sUbject.' (Res. Br.,:p. 6.) In other words, the
respondent contends that the rejc~ted testimony was merely
" cumulative, and that its rejection; was not prejudicinl. This
, is au unrealistic approach to the question . . . [T]hc probate
I: judie seemed to be of the opinion:that the burden to show a
" divorce rested upon appellant. and seemed to feel that that
"burden could only be met by record evidence of a divorce.
~i In both assumptions the trial judge was wrong. Moreover,
~this respondent had to offer some reasou for marrying Nichols,
~'C)therwise she would be guilty of deliberate bi~amy. Smith was
ftnot here to deny her statements.. Nichols, although present
~St the conversation, ,was not produced nor was his absence
~UpJained before the probate court. To say the least, the
P\'Vidence as to whether there was or was not a divorce from
j;!Smith was most tenuous and uncertain, with a strong prelriitmption that a divorce had been secured. Thus, to have
~exe1uded the decedent's own statements on this subject made
f~'to several persons on many occasions was ob,iously error of '
~\ most prejudicial nature. "
~t That the burden was on respondent to prove the illegality
<!o'bf her marriage to Nichols tberecan be no question. As pre~:''';''rit\",.t'V stated, the presumption of innocence of crime is one
the strongest of the disputable presumptions known to the
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1963; 10 Cal.Jur. 754, 762-764,
eases tbere cited; see, also, People v. Shorts (1948), 32
502, 507 [197 P.2d 330}.) And as declared in Esof Hughson (1916), 173 Cal. 448, 453 [160 P. 548],
rt1luOting from Hunter v. Hunter (1916), 111 Cal. 261, 267
756,52 Am.St.Rep. 180,31 L.R.A. 411}, "Tbere is also
ana a very strong one, in favor of tbe legality
marriage regularly solemnized. Rather than bold a
Fitliil.iad marriage invalid and that' the parties have committed
....",c.,..-'--- or been guilty of immorality, the courts bave often
in the presumption of death in less tban seven
Irj'ears. or, where the absent party was shown to be alive, bave
~allo,ved a presumption that the absent party has procured a
A more correct statemetlt perbaps would be that
burden is east upon the pariy asserting guilt or immorality
the negative-that the first marriage had not ended
the second marriage. "
IWInJUnU'~n1; bere, in order to meet the burden of proving
bi5!~mlY of whicb sbe asserts she is guilty, relied in tbe
court solely upon the fact that the testator in his

)
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will left $5.00 "to my wife," and upon testimony that no
record had been found of a Reno divorce or of any California
divorce proceedings between the parties, although search had
been made in Reno and in all California counties except
two. Despite the total lack of evidence that the parties had
not been divorced elsewhere, and despite respondent's testimony that the testator had declared to her that a divorce
had been procured by him, that service had been accomplished
by publication, that he had at that time a copy of the decree
in 8 safety deposit bot, and that she was free to marry Nichols
-:-a declaration which she accepted and upon which she acted
until such time as she discovered that the testator had died
leaving a substantial estate--the probate court found that she
is the testator's widow. This reliance upon the words "to
my wife" as the basis for the finding that respondent is the
widow of decedent serves but to aggravate the prejudicial
effect of the error in excluding the decedent's repeated
.declarations that ~ewas his "ex~wife:'''----' _
The portion of the judgment appealed from should be
reversed.

